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Abstract
Multiplicative linear secret sharing is a fundamental notion in the area of secure multi-
party computation (MPC) and, since recently, in the area of two-party cryptography as
well. In a nutshell, this notion guarantees that “the product of two secrets is obtained as
a linear function of the vector consisting of the coordinate-wise product of two respective
share-vectors”. This paper focuses on the following foundational question, which is novel
to the best of our knowledge. Suppose we abandon the latter linearity condition and
instead require that this product is obtained by some, not-necessarily-linear “product
reconstruction function”. Is the resulting notion equivalent to multiplicative linear secret
sharing? We show the (perhaps somewhat counter-intuitive) result that this relaxed no-
tion is strictly more general. Concretely, fix a finite field Fq as the base field over which
linear secret sharing is considered. Then we show there exists an (exotic) linear secret
sharing scheme with an unbounded number of players n such that it has t-privacy with
t = Ω(n) and such that it does admit a product reconstruction function, yet this function
is necessarily nonlinear. In addition, we determine the minimum number of players for
which those exotic schemes exist. Our proof is based on combinatorial arguments involv-
ing quadratic forms. It extends to similar separation results for important variations,
such as strongly multiplicative secret sharing.
Keywords: (arithmetic) secret sharing.
1 Introduction
Multiplicative linear secret sharing is a fundamental notion in the area of secure multi-party
computation (MPC). By extension, this holds in the area of two-party cryptography as well,
by virtue of recently discovered deep applications of MPC to two-party cryptography as
initiated in [12].
While linear secret sharing is additive in the sense that “the sum of share-vectors cor-
responds to the sum of the secrets”, multiplicative linear secret sharing enjoys the further
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property that “the product of two secrets is obtained as a linear function of the vector
consisting of the coordinate-wise product of two respective share-vectors”. There are sev-
eral important (more demanding) variations on this notion, such as strongly multiplicative
secret sharing. First framed and studied in [8] in the late 1990s as an abstract property
of a linear secret sharing scheme, 1 it had been implicit in several results since the mid
1980s (notably [2, 5, 11]) in the context of application of Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [16]
to (information-theoretically) secure multi-party computation. The asymptotical (constant-
rate) theory of strongly multiplicative schemes has been initiated in [6], using algebraic ge-
ometry. 2 It has found several notable applications, starting with [12]. For a full discussion
and references, please refer to [4].
This paper focuses on the following foundational question, which is novel to the best
of our knowledge. Suppose we abandon the latter linearity condition and instead require
that the product of the two secrets is obtained by application of some, not-necessarily-linear
“product reconstruction function”. Is the resulting notion equivalent to multiplicative linear
secret sharing?
We show the (perhaps somewhat counter-intuitive) result that this relaxed notion is
strictly more general. Concretely, fix a finite field Fq as the base field Fq over which linear
secret sharing is considered. Then we show there exists an (exotic) linear secret sharing
scheme with an unbounded number of players n such that it has t-privacy with t = Ω(n) and
such that it does admit a product reconstruction function, yet this function is necessarily
nonlinear.
The existence of such counterexamples can be explained from the difference between
linear and algebraic independence of certain multivariate polynomials. For instance, the
polynomials X, Y , XY are linearly independent but algebraically dependent. Nevertheless,
since the involved polynomials are homogeneous with degree 2, quadratic forms are a powerful
tool to solve our problem.
Indeed, by means of combinatorial arguments involving bilinear and quadratic forms,
we find examples of linear secret sharing schemes with nonlinear product reconstruction on
a small number of players. Our main result is then obtained by composing those small
examples with multiplicative linear secret sharing schemes on an arbitrary number of players
n that have t-privacy with t = Ω(n). The existence of such schemes over any fixed base
field Fq was proved in [3, 7]. As an additional result, we determine the minimum number of
players for which such exotic schemes exist. Our results extend to similar separation results
for important variations, such as strongly multiplicative secret sharing.
It is an interesting question whether there are applications of this “exotic”, novel class of
secret sharing schemes with nonlinear product reconstruction 3 to cryptographic protocols,
but we will not offer any speculations here.
We remark that, while the notion of multiplicativity defined in [8] applies to linear secret
sharing schemes where each share may consist of an arbitrary number of elements of the
field Fq, in this work our definitions and results concern only ideal linear secret sharing
schemes, i.e., those where each share is a single element of the field Fq. This is the notion
considered in e.g. [3, 6, 7]. If the local function is the component-wise product of the share-
vectors, then the analysis is the same for both cases. If any bilinear function can be used in
the local computations, then the general case can be reduced to the case of ideal schemes
1It was shown, in particular, when and how a multiplicative scheme can be obtained from just a linear
secret sharing scheme. However, this does not work for strong multiplicativity.
2Later, this asymptotical theory has also been developed in the case of multiplicative schemes using classical
coding theory in [5]. The results there do not seem to carry over easily to strong multiplicative schemes.
3All applications of multiplicative linear secret sharing we are aware of make essential use of linearity of
product reconstruction.
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(maybe except for fields of characteristic 2). 4
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall some elementary theory of
bilinear and quadratic forms over finite fields. In Section 3, we review the standard definition
of multiplicative linear secret sharing in Definition 3.1. In Section 4, we formally define
our relaxation of multiplicative linear secret sharing in Definition 4.1 and state in Main
Theorem 4.3 our main separation result, i.e., the existence of “exotic schemes” with an
unbounded number of players n and t-privacy with t = Ω(n).
In Section 5 we show that both the multiplicativity notion and its relaxed notion of
product reconstruction can be captured in terms of the existence of quadratic forms with
certain algebraic conditions imposed on them (see Propositions 5.1 and 5.2). This leads us
to defining the “separating quadratic forms”, which are characterized in Propositions 5.3
and 5.4 by using the classification of quadratic forms over finite fields.
By using those results, several examples of linear secret sharing schemes that prove the
separation between the two notions are presented in Section 6. Specifically, for every finite
field Fq, we present examples of Fq-linear secret sharing schemes with nonlinear product
reconstruction on n players, where n = 9 if q ≥ 3 and n = 14 if q = 2.
In Section 7, we review a well known method of combining secret sharing schemes and we
analyze the behavior of product reconstruction under this composition in Propositions 7.2
and 7.3. At this point, Main Theorem 4.3 is proved by composing the examples on a small
number of players presented in Section 6 with multiplicative linear secret sharing schemes
whose privacy is linear on the number of players. Moreover, this composition technique
makes it possible to extend our results to strongly multiplicative secret sharing.
Finally, in Section 8, we prove that it is not possible to find examples separating the two
notions on less than 9 players. Therefore, the examples presented in Section 6 are among
the smallest ones.
2 Preliminaries
We fix notations for linear algebra and we recall some basic facts about bilinear and quadratic
forms. Most of the material covered in this section (tensor products, bilinear and quadratic
forms) can be found in algebra handbooks as [14]. More specific references concerning clas-
sification of quadratic forms will be given later.
Let Fq denote a finite field of cardinality q = pm. The prime number p is the characteristic
of Fq and is denoted by charFq. Let V be an Fq-vector space with dimV = k. If S ⊂ V is a
non-empty set, then 〈S〉 denotes the span of S, that is, the Fq-linear subspace of V generated
by the elements of S. The Fq-vector space V ∗ of the linear forms V → Fq is called the dual
space of V . If {e1, . . . , ek} is a basis of V , its dual basis is the basis {e1, . . . , ek} of V ∗ whose
elements are determined by ei(ej) = 1 if i = j and e
i(ej) = 0 otherwise. For reference later
on, we include the following trivial lemma.
Lemma 2.1. Let V be an Fq-vector space, W ⊂ V a vector subspace, and x ∈ V . Then
x /∈ W if and only if there is a linear form α ∈ V ∗ such that α(x) 6= 0 and α(y) = 0 for
every y ∈W .
A bilinear form on V is a map B : V × V → Fq such that, for all x, y, z ∈ V , λ ∈ Fq, the
following holds.
• B(x+ y, z) = B(x, z) +B(y, z).
4Of course our results do not rule out that separating examples with a smaller number of players exist in
the non-ideal case, but we do not elaborate further on this matter.
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• B(x, y + z) = B(x, y) +B(x, z).
• B(λx, y) = B(x, λy) = λB(x, y).
The vector space formed by all bilinear forms on V is denoted by Bil(V ). By the universal
property of the tensor product, there exists an isomorphism V ∗ ⊗ V ∗ ∼= Bil(V ) mapping
α ⊗ β ∈ V ∗ ⊗ V ∗ into the bilinear form on V defined by α ⊗ β(x, y) = α(x)β(y) for all
x, y ∈ V . By duality, there is an isomorphism V ⊗ V ∼= Bil(V ∗) which maps x⊗ y ∈ V ⊗ V
into x⊗ y(α, β) := α(x)β(y). The bilinear forms α⊗ β span Bil(V ). Moreover, if {ei}1≤i≤k
is a basis of V ∗, then {ei ⊗ ej}1≤i,j≤k is a basis of Bil(V ), which has dimension k2.
Moreover, there is an isomorphism V ⊗ V ∼= Bil(V )∗ that maps x⊗ y ∈ V ⊗ V into the
linear form on Bil(V ) determined by α⊗ β 7→ α(x)β(y). Composition with the isomorphism
Bil(V ∗) ∼= V ⊗ V described above yields an isomorphism Bil(V ∗) ∼= Bil(V )∗ which maps
B ∈ Bil(V ∗) into the linear form determined by α⊗ β 7→ B(α, β).
The matrix M of a bilinear form B on V with respect to a basis {ei}1≤i≤k of V is
M = (B(ei, ej))1≤i,j≤k. For a bilinear form B on V , consider the linear maps B1 : V → V ∗
and B2 : V → V ∗, where, for every x ∈ V , the linear forms B1(x) and B2(x) are defined by
B1(x)(y) = B(x, y) and B2(x)(y) = B(y, x), respectively. The linear maps B1 and B2 have
the same rank, which is equal to the rank of any matrix associated to B. This value is called
the rank of the bilinear form B and is denoted by rkB. A proof for the following lemma can
be found in [1, II, §7, no. 8].
Lemma 2.2. The rank of a bilinear form B ∈ Bil(V ) equals the minimum integer `0 ≥ 0 such
that there exist linear forms α1, . . . , α`0 , β1, . . . , β`0 ∈ V ∗ with B = ∑`0i=1 αi ⊗ βi.
The transpose of a bilinear form B ∈ Bil(V ) is the bilinear form Bt ∈ Bil(V ) defined by
Bt(x, y) = B(y, x) for all x, y ∈ V . A bilinear form B ∈ Bil(V ) is symmetric if B = Bt, and
it is alternating if B(x, x) = 0, for all x ∈ V . The Fq-vector space consisting of all symmetric
(respectively, alternating) bilinear forms on V is denoted by Sym(V ) (respectively, Alt(V )).
Lemma 2.3. For all B ∈ Alt(V ), it holds that B = −Bt. If the characteristic is different
from 2, the converse also holds.
Proof. For all x, y ∈ V , it holds that B(x + y, x + y) = B(x, x) + B(x, y) + B(y, x) +
B(y, y). Since B(x, x) = B(y, y) = B(x + y, x + y) = 0, it follows that B(x, y) = −B(y, x).
On the other hand, if B = −Bt, then B(x, x) = −B(x, x) for all x ∈ V . This implies
B(x, x) = 0 for all x ∈ V if the characteristic is different from 2. 4
Lemma 2.4. If the characteristic is different from 2, then Bil(V ) is the direct sum of Sym(V )
and Alt(V ).
Proof. If the characteristic is different from 2, then Sym(V ) ∩ Alt(V ) = {0} by
Lemma 2.3. In addition, for every B ∈ Bil(V ),
B =
B +Bt
2
+
B −Bt
2
.
The first and the second terms on the right-hand side are, respectively, in Sym(V ) and
Alt(V ). 4
In some of our proofs in Section 5 we will consider elements in Bil(V ) of the form pi ⊗ pi
for some pi ∈ V ∗. These elements span the vector space Sym(V ) of the symmetric bilinear
forms on V . Indeed, if {e1, . . . , ek} is a basis of V ∗, then the terms ei ⊗ ei with 1 ≤ i ≤ k
and (ei + ej)⊗ (ei + ej) with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k constitute a basis of Sym(V ). In particular, the
dimension of Sym(V ) is k(k + 1)/2.
A quadratic form on V is a map Q : V → Fq such that
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• Q(λx) = λ2Q(x) for all x ∈ V, λ ∈ Fq,
• the map (x, y) 7→ Q(x+ y)−Q(x)−Q(y) is a bilinear form on V .
The Fq-vector space of all quadratic forms on V is denoted by Quad(V ).
Every bilinear form B ∈ Bil(V ) defines a quadratic form QB : V → Fq on V by taking
QB(x) = B(x, x) for every x ∈ V . This induces an isomorphism Bil(V )/Alt(V ) ∼= Quad(V ).
By Lemma 2.4, if charFq 6= 2 this induces an isomorphism Sym(V ) ∼= Quad(V ) as well.
Lemma 2.5. There exists an isomorphism φ : Quad(V ∗)→ Sym(V )∗ such that φ(Q)(α⊗α) =
Q(α) for all Q ∈ Quad(V ∗) and all α ∈ V ∗.
Proof. Recall that we have an isomorphism Bil(V ∗) ∼= Bil(V )∗ that maps B ∈ Bil(V ∗)
into the linear form determined by α⊗ β 7→ B(α, β). Composing it with the restriction map
Bil(V )∗ → Sym(V )∗, we obtain a surjective linear map Bil(V ∗)→ Sym(V )∗ whose kernel is
Alt(V ∗). Indeed, B ∈ Bil(V ∗) is in the kernel if and only if B(α, α) = 0 for every α ∈ V ∗.
This gives an isomorphism Bil(V ∗)/Alt(V ∗) ∼= Sym(V )∗, and the lemma follows composing
it with the isomorphism Quad(V ∗) ∼= Bil(V ∗)/Alt(V ∗) considered above. 4
We need to introduce some results about the classification of quadratic forms. Proofs
for these results can be found in [13, 15] for fields of odd characteristic and in [9, 10] for
the characteristic 2 case. Let Q1, Q2 be two quadratic forms on V . They are said to be
equivalent if there exists an automorphism ψ of V such that Q1 = Q2 ◦ ψ.
We associate to a quadratic form Q ∈ Quad(V ) the symmetric bilinear form B˜Q ∈
Sym(V ) defined by (x, y) 7→ Q(x + y) − Q(x) − Q(y). We define the radical RadQ V of V
with respect to Q as the kernel of the linear map (B˜Q)1 : V → V ∗, that is,
RadQ V := {x ∈ V : B˜Q(x, y) = 0 for all y ∈ V }.
First consider the case charFq 6= 2. Then the map
Q 7→ BQ := 1
2
B˜Q
is an isomorphism between the vector spaces Quad(V ) and Sym(V ). Let Q1, Q2 be quadratic
forms. Fix a basis of V and, for i = 1, 2, take the matrix Mi associated to BQi . Then Q1 and
Q2 are equivalent if and only if there exists an invertible matrix P such that M1 = PM2P
t.
The rank of a quadratic form Q is defined as the rank of BQ. If Q has full rank k, then the
discriminant of Q is defined as the class in the group F∗q/(F∗q)
2 ∼= {1,−1} of the determinant
of any matrix associated to BQ. If Q has rank r < k, then it induces a decomposition
V = RadQ V ⊕ V ′ such that V ′ has dimension r and the restriction Q′ of Q to V ′ has full
rank. In this case the discriminant of Q is defined to be the discriminant of Q′. It holds
that two quadratic forms are equivalent if and only if they have the same rank and the same
discriminant [13].
Consider now the case charFq = 2. In this case, quadratic forms are classified by the
rank and the Arf invariant. Let Q be a quadratic form on V . In the characteristic 2
case, the rank is defined as follows. Let r′ be the codimension of RadQ V , which is always
even. If there exists x ∈ RadQ V such that Q(x) 6= 0 then we define the rank of Q to
be r′ + 1. In this case the Arf invariant is not defined, as the rank suffices to classify the
forms: two quadratic forms having the same, odd rank are equivalent. Otherwise, i.e. if Q
identically vanishes on RadQ V , the rank of Q is defined to be r
′. If Q has rank r = k = 2
and {v1, v2} is any Fq-basis of V then the Arf invariant of Q is defined to be the class of
Q(v1)Q(v2)/(B˜Q(v1, v2))
2
in Fq/L, where L = {λ2 + λ : λ ∈ Fq}, the kernel of the trace
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map Tr: Fq → F2. Note that Fq/L ∼= F2. In general, if Q has even rank r then it induces a
decomposition V = RadQ V ⊕
⊕r/2
i=1 Vi. If, for i = 1, . . . , r/2, we denote by Qi the restriction
of Q to Vi, then the Arf invariant of Q is defined to be the sum of the Arf invariants of the
Qi’s. It holds that two quadratic forms having the same, even rank are equivalent if and
only if they have the same Arf invariant.
3 Multiplicative Linear Secret Sharing
For the purposes of this paper, a linear secret sharing scheme Σ over Fq is a tuple (n, V, (pii)ni=0)
in the following conditions.
• V is an Fq-vector space of finite dimension.
• pi0 ∈ V ∗ \ {0} and pi1, . . . , pin ∈ V ∗.
• pi0 is in the span of {pii}ni=1.
The set {1, . . . , n} is the player set. Let A ⊂ {1, . . . , n} be a non-empty set. If pi0 ∈
〈{pii}i∈A〉, then A is accepting. Otherwise, A is rejecting.
Let s ∈ Fq, the secret. Select x ∈ V uniformly at random such that pi0(x) = s. This is
possible since pi0 6= 0. The elements pi1(x), . . . , pin(x) are the shares. The joint shares of A
corresponds to the vector (pii(x))i∈A ∈ F|A|q .
If A is accepting, then there is an Fq-linear form ρA : F
|A|
q −→ Fq, the (linear) reconstruc-
tion function for A, such that ρA((pii(x))i∈A) = pi0(x) = s, for all x ∈ Fkq . In other words, if
A is accepting, the secret can be reconstructed (linearly) from the joint shares of A.
On the other hand, if A is non-empty and rejecting, then the random variable (pii(x))i∈A
does not depend on the choice of the secret s. To prove this claim, the key observation is
that, by Lemma 2.1, pi0 /∈ 〈{pii}i∈A〉 if and only if there exists z ∈ V (where z may depend
on A) such that pi0(z) = 1 and pii(z) = 0 for all i ∈ A. Indeed, let s′ ∈ Fq be an arbitrary
secret and write λ = s′ − s. Then choosing x′ ∈ V uniformly at random with pi0(x′) = s′ is
equivalent to choosing uniformly at random a vector of the form x+λz ∈ V with pi0(x) = s.
It holds that (pii(x+ λz))i∈A = (pii(x) + λpii(z))i∈A = (pii(x))i∈A.
The access structure Γ(Σ) of the scheme collects the accepting sets, whereas the adversary
structure A(Σ) collects the rejecting sets. Let t, r be integers with 0 ≤ t < r ≤ n. The
scheme has r-reconstruction if Γ(Σ) contains all subsets of {1, . . . , n} of cardinality at least
r and it has t-privacy if A(Σ) contains all subsets of {1, . . . , n} of cardinality at most t. By
definition, the scheme is n-reconstructing. Of course, it could be r-reconstructing as well, for
some r < n. Note that the definition of linear secret sharing does not guarantee any privacy.
Although any interesting schemes do in fact offer privacy, it is convenient not to include this
as a requirement in the definition here.
Note that we will not consider any of the more general definitions of linear secret sharing
from the literature in this paper, such as those allowing the secrets (and/or the shares) to be
vectors rather than single field elements.
Definition 3.1 (Multiplicative linear secret sharing [8]). Let Σ = (n, V, (pii)
n
i=0) be an LSSS
over Fq. It is multiplicative (M1) if there is an Fq-linear form ρ : Fnq −→ Fq such that, for
all x, y ∈ V ,
ρ(z1, . . . , zn) = pi0(x) · pi0(y),
where
(z1, . . . , zn) = (pi1(x) · pi1(y), . . . , pin(x) · pin(y)).
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In other words, “the product of two secrets is obtained as a linear function of the vector
consisting of the coordinate-wise product of two respective share-vectors”. This is a special
property that is not generally satisfied by linear secret sharing schemes. Please refer to [8, 7]
for more information about constructions and bounds. The multiplicative property can be
characterized in terms of the properties of the symmetric bilinear forms pii ⊗ pii.
Proposition 3.2. A linear secret sharing scheme Σ = (n, V, (pii)
n
i=0) is M1 if and only if
pi0 ⊗ pi0 is in the span of {pii ⊗ pii}ni=1.
Proof. By Definition 3.1, Σ is M1 if and only if there exist λ1, . . . , λn ∈ Fq such that
pi0(x) · pi0(y) =
∑n
i=1 λipii(x) · pii(y), for all x, y ∈ V . 4
Given Σ = (n, V, (pii)
n
i=0) and a set A of players and a set A of players, we notate ΣA for
the linear secret sharing scheme ΣA = (|A|, k, (pii)i∈{0}∪A), that is, the restriction of Σ to the
players in A.
Definition 3.3. A linear secret sharing scheme Σ = (n, V, (pii)
n
i=0) is said to be t-strongly
multiplicative if Σ has t-privacy and, for every set A consisting of n − t players, ΣA is a
multiplicative linear secret sharing scheme.
4 Our Contributions
The focus in this paper is on the following theoretical question, which is novel to the best
of our knowledge. Consider multiplicative linear secret sharing, where “the product of two
secrets is obtained as a linear function of the vector consisting of the coordinate-wise product
of two respective share-vectors”. Suppose we abandon the linearity condition and instead
make the relaxed requirement that this product is obtained by some, not-necessarily-linear
function. Is the resulting notion equivalent to multiplicative linear secret sharing? We show
the (perhaps somewhat counter-intuitive) result that this relaxed notion is strictly more
general.
Definition 4.1 (Relaxation of Multiplicative Secret Sharing). Let Σ = (n, V, (pii)
n
i=0) be an
LSSS over Fq. The scheme has product reconstruction (M2) if, for all x, x′, y, y′ ∈ V with
pi1(x) · pi1(y) = pi1(x′) · pi1(y′), . . . , pin(x) · pin(y) = pin(x′) · pin(y′),
it holds that
pi0(x) · pi0(y) = pi0(x′) · pi0(y′).
Note that the product reconstruction condition is equivalent to the existence of a product
reconstruction function ρ′ : Fnq −→ Fq such that
ρ′(pi1(x) · pi1(y), . . . , pin(x) · pin(y)) = pi0(x) · pi0(y),
for all x, y ∈ V . In particular, a multiplicative linear secret sharing scheme (see Definition 3.1)
is one for which a linear product reconstruction function exists. Thus, the M1 condition
implies the M2 condition. As a consequence of our results the converse does not hold.
Remark 4.2. There does not appear to be much that one can say, a priori, about the com-
plexity of such not-necessarily-linear product reconstruction functions. At best, one can say
that in order to determine the product of two secrets from the coordinate-wise product of two
corresponding share-vectors, it suffices to solve a system of quadratic equations.
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Main Theorem 4.3. Let Fq be the finite field of q elements. There exists a function tq(n) ∈
Ω(n) such that for infinitely many values of n ∈ N, there exists a linear secret sharing
scheme Σ = (n, V, (pii)
n
i=0) over Fq such that it has tq(n)-privacy and such that it admits a
product reconstruction function (M2). However, such function is necessarily not Fq-linear.
Therefore, it is not a multiplicative linear secret sharing scheme (i.e., not M1).
We state next other results that are proved in this work. The following two theorems
prove that, for every finite field Fq with q ≥ 3, n = 9 is the minimum value for which there
exists an Fq-linear secret sharing scheme on n players that is M2 but not M1. This value
remains undetermined for q = 2, but it is at least 9.
Theorem 4.4. For every finite field Fq with q ≥ 3, there exists an Fq-linear secret sharing
scheme on 9 players that is M2 but not M1. In addition, there exists an F2-linear secret
sharing scheme on 14 players that is M2 but not M1.
Theorem 4.5. Every M2 linear secret sharing scheme on at most 8 players is also M1.
In addition, we extend our separation result to the notion of strong multiplication.
Theorem 4.6. Let Fq be the finite field of q elements. There exists a function tˆq(n) ∈
Ω(n) such that for an unbounded number n ∈ N, there exists a linear secret sharing scheme
Σ = (n, V, (pii)
n
i=0) over Fq such that Σ has tˆq(n)-privacy and for each set A consisting of
n − tˆq(n) players, ΣA admits a product reconstruction function (M2). However there exists
a set A with n− tˆq(n) players such that ΣA is not M1. Therefore, Σ is not a tˆq(n)-strongly
multiplicative linear secret sharing scheme.
5 Separating Quadrating Forms
In this section we characterize properties M1 and M2, or rather, their negations, separately.
The characterization of the M2 property is given in terms of a class of quadratic forms, which
we call separating. We provide a characterization for this class.
Proposition 5.1 (Not-M1 Characterization). Let Σ = (n, V, (pii)
n
i=0) be an Fq-linear secret
sharing scheme. Then Σ is not M1 if and only if there exists a quadratic form Q ∈ Quad(V ∗)
such that Q(pi1) = · · · = Q(pin) = 0 and Q(pi0) 6= 0.
Proof. Straightforward from Proposition 3.2, Lemma 2.1, and the isomorphism between
Sym(V )∗ and Quad(V ∗) in Lemma 2.5. 4
Given x, y, x′, y′ ∈ V , consider the bilinear form Tx,y,x′,y′ = x ⊗ y − x′ ⊗ y′ ∈ Bil(V ∗)
and its associated quadratic form Qx,y,x′,y′ ∈ Quad(V ∗). A quadratic form Q ∈ Quad(V ∗) is
called separating if Q 6= Qx,y,x′,y′ for every x, y, x′, y′ ∈ V .
Proposition 5.2 (Not-M2 Characterization). Let Σ = (n, V, (pii)
n
i=0) be an Fq-linear secret
sharing scheme. Then Σ is not M2 if and only if there exist vectors x, y, x′, y′ ∈ V such that
Qx,y,x′,y′(pi1) = · · · = Qx,y,x′,y′(pin) = 0 and Qx,y,x′,y′(pi0) 6= 0.
Proof. Obvious from Definition 4.1. 4
As a consequence of the last two theorems, Σ = (n, V, (pii)
n
i=0) is M2 but not M1 if
and only if and only if there exists a quadratic form Q ∈ Quad(V ∗) such that Q(pi1) =
· · · = Q(pin) = 0 and Q(pi0) 6= 0, and all such quadratic forms are separating. Next two
propositions provide a characterization of the separating forms.
Proposition 5.3. No quadratic form of rank r ≤ 3 is separating. All quadratic forms of
rank r ≥ 5 are separating.
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Proof. If Q is not separating, then Q = Qx,y,x′,y′ for some x, y, x
′, y′ ∈ V . Then the
associated bilinear form B˜Q defined at the end of Section 2 is given by B˜Q = x ⊗ y + y ⊗
x − x′ ⊗ y′ − y′ ⊗ x′. By Lemma 2.2, this bilinear form has rank at most 4. This directly
implies that non-separating forms have rank at most 4, since in the case charFq = 2, when
the rank of B˜Q is exactly 4 it is easy to see that Q is identically zero in RadQ V . This proves
the second claim of the theorem.
We prove the first statement for forms of rank r = 3, being the cases with r ≤ 2 similar.
LetQ ∈ Quad(V ∗) be a quadratic form of rank 3. Clearly, we can assume that k = dimV = 3.
Suppose first that charFq 6= 2. By the classification of quadratic forms, there exists a
basis {e1, e2, e3} of V such that, for some α ∈ F∗q , the matrix associated to the symmetric
bilinear form BQ is 0 1 01 0 0
0 0 α
 .
Therefore, Q is not separating because BQ = e1 ⊗ e2 + e2 ⊗ e1 + αe3 ⊗ e3, and this implies
that Q = Qx,y,x′,y′ with x = 2e1, y = e2, x
′ = αe3 and y′ = −e3.
Assume now that charFq = 2. By the classification of quadratic forms, Q is determined
by a bilinear form T ∈ Bil(V ∗) such that its matrix in some suitable basis {e1, e2, e3} of V is0 1 00 0 0
0 0 1
 .
Then T = Te1,e2,e3,e3 , and hence Q is not separating. 4
It remains to study what happens for quadratic forms of rank r = 4. Briefly, up to
equivalence, there are two quadratic forms of rank 4, and only one of them is separating.
Proposition 5.4. If charFq 6= 2, a quadratic form of rank r = 4 is separating if and only
if its discriminant is −1. If charFq = 2, a quadratic form of rank r = 4 is separating if and
only if its Arf invariant is 1.
Proof. Let Q ∈ Quad(V ∗) be a quadratic form of rank r = 4. As before, we can assume
that k = dimV = 4. Suppose that Q is not separating, that is, Q = Qx,y,x′,y′ for some
x, y, x′, y′.
Suppose that charFq 6= 2. Then the symmetric bilinear form associated to Q is
BQ =
1
2
(x⊗ y + y ⊗ x)− 1
2
(x′ ⊗ y′ + y′ ⊗ x′).
If {x, y, x′, y′} is a linearly dependent set, then rkBQ ≤ 3 by Lemma 2.2. Therefore,
{x, y, x′, y′} is a basis of V . The determinant of the matrix of BQ in this basis is equal
to (1/4)2, and hence the discriminant of Q is equal to 1.
If charFq = 2, then B˜Q = x⊗y+y⊗x+x′⊗y′+y′⊗x′. Again, {x, y, x′, y′} = {e1, e2, e3, e4}
is a basis of V . Let {e1, e2, e3, e4} be the dual basis of V ∗. The Arf invariant of Q is equal
to 0 because Q(ei) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , 4 and hence Q(e1)Q(e2) +Q(e3)Q(e4) = 0. 4
6 Finding “Exotic Schemes”
We apply here the results in Section 5 to find examples of linear secret sharing schemes that
are M2 but not M1. Specifically, we prove Theorem 4.4 and we present some additional
examples of interest.
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Associated to an Fq-linear secret sharing scheme Σ = (n, V, (pii)ni=0), consider the subspace
W (Σ) = 〈{pii ⊗ pii}i=1,...,n〉 ⊂ Sym(V )
and its annihilator
I(Σ) = {φ ∈ Sym(V )∗ : φ(B) = 0 for every B ∈W (Σ)} ⊂ Sym(V )∗ ∼= Quad(V ∗).
Recall that Σ is M1 if and only if pi0⊗pi0 ∈W (Σ). By linear algebra, these subspaces satisfy
dimW (Σ) + dim I(Σ) = dim Sym(V ) =
k(k + 1)
2
.
If W (Σ) = Sym(V ), then pi0 ⊗ pi0 ∈ W (Σ), and hence Σ is M1. In the case dimW (Σ) =
dim Sym(V )−1, we obtain the following sufficient condition for a linear secret sharing scheme
to be M2 but not M1.
Proposition 6.1 (Sufficient Separation Conditions). Suppose Σ satisfies the following con-
ditions.
1. dimW (Σ) = dim Sym(V )− 1.
2. There is a separating quadratic form Q ∈ Quad(V ∗) such that Q(pii) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , n
while Q(pi0) 6= 0.
Then Σ has product reconstruction (is M2) but Σ does not have linear product reconstruction
(is not M1).
Proof. Condition 2 implies that Σ is not M1. The subspace I(Σ) ⊂ Sym(V )∗ has
dimension 1, so I(Σ) = 〈Q〉, where Q is the separating form in Condition 2. Therefore, all
non-zero elements in I(Σ) are separating, which implies that Σ is M2 by Proposition 5.2. 4
At this point, we can apply this sufficient condition to present the first example of a
linear secret sharing scheme that is M2 but not M1. Take q = 5 and V = F55, and fix a basis
of V . Consider the symmetric bilinear form T ∈ Sym(V ∗) that is represented by the 5 × 5
identity matrix and the quadratic form Q that is determined by T . Obviously, rkQ = 5,
and hence Q is separating by Proposition 5.3. Our example is a linear secret sharing scheme
Σ = (14, V, (pii)
14
i=0) such that dimW (Σ) = dim Sym(V ) − 1 = 14 and I(Σ) = 〈Q〉. That is,
we have to find pi0, . . . , pi14 ∈ V ∗ such that {pii ⊗ pii}14i=1 is linearly independent, Q(pii) = 0
for i = 1, . . . , 14, and Q(pi0) 6= 0. Then Σ is M2 but not M1 by Proposition 6.1. A suitable
choice for (pii)
14
i=0 is given by the column vectors of the following matrix.
1 1 1 1 1 0 0
1 2 0 0 0 1 1
1 0 2 0 0 2 0
1 0 0 2 0 0 2
2 0 0 0 2 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 3 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 3 0 0
0 2 0 1 0 0 3 0
2 0 2 2 0 0 0 3
 .
It is easy to see that Σ achieves 2-privacy.
We use again Proposition 6.1 to present a similar example over F2. Take V = F52 and fix
a basis for V . Consider the quadratic form Q ∈ Quad(V ∗) defined by the bilinear form T
with matrix 
1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0
 .
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Observe that Q is separating because it has rank 5. Reasoning as in the previous example
we obtain that the linear secret sharing scheme determined by the matrix
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 1 0

is M2 but not M1.
Similarly to the first one, the following example is again linear secret sharing scheme Σ
with dimension k = 5 over F5, but in this case the number of players is reduced to n = 13.
This is achieved by taking dim I(Σ) = 2. Consider the quadratic forms Q1, Q2 ∈ Quad(V ∗)
determined by the symmetric bilinear forms with matrices
M1 =

1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 2 0
0 0 0 0 2
 , M2 =

0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 2 0
0 1 2 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
 ,
respectively. One can check that all nonzero linear combinations of these two matrices have
rank 5. As a consequence, all nonzero forms in 〈Q1, Q2〉 have rank 5, and hence they are
separating. Next, we present a linear secret sharing scheme Σ = (13,F55, (pii)13i=0) such that it
is not M1 and I(Σ) = 〈Q1, Q2〉. Clearly, Σ is M2. A possible choice is given by the columns
of the matrix 
1 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 2 3 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 2 3 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 2 3
0 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 4 1 1 4
1 3 3 1 4 1 4
3 1 1 1 4 0 0
0 3 2 0 0 4 4
 .
There exist separating quadratic forms of rank 4, and they have been characterized in
Proposition 5.4. Therefore, we can apply Proposition 6.1 to find examples with dimension
k = 4 on 9 = k(k + 1)/2 − 1 players. In each of the three following examples, we consider
V = F4q , where the characteristic of the field is different from 2, and a quadratic form
Q ∈ Quad(V ∗) that is determined by a symmetric matrix
D =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 α
 .
Take q = 3 and α = −1. As the determinant of D is not a square in F3, Q is separating.
In addition, Q has at least 9 different zeros in F43, so we can construct a linear secret sharing
scheme Σ = (9,F43, (pii)9i=0) which is M2 but not M1. An example is
0 1 0 0 2 0 0 2 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 2 0 1 2 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 1 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
 .
The previous example generalizes as follows. Take α = −1 and a prime power q such
that −1 is not a square in Fq. As before, Q is separating. Observe that a2 + b2 6= 0 for
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every a, b ∈ F∗q because −1 is not a square in Fq. Therefore, there exist a, b, c ∈ F∗q with
a2 + b2 + c2 = 0. The previous discussion implies that the matrix
1 1 0 0 −1 0 0 −a a a
0 0 1 0 0 −1 0 b −b b
0 0 0 1 0 0 −1 c c −c
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
 .
defines a linear secret sharing scheme Σ = (9,F4q , (pii)9i=0) that is M2 but not M1.
We now consider the case of a field Fq with charFq 6= 2 containing a square root i of −1.
Let α be a non-square in Fq, and assume further that α 6= i. Note that this choice is always
possible, replacing i with −i if necessary. Again, Q is separating and we find another linear
secret sharing scheme that is M2 but not M1.
1 1 1 0 1 1 α+12
α+1
2 0
α+1
2
0 i 0 1 −i 0 i(α−1)2 0 α+12 i(α−1)2
0 0 i i 0 −i 0 i(α−1)2 i(α−1)2 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 i i i −i
 .
Finally, we present another example on 9 players, this time over fields of characteristic
2. Let Fq = F2[α], with α 6∈ F2, be an arbitrary field extension of F2, and assume Tr(α) = 1.
Note that it is always possible to choose such an α. So the form
Q =

0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 α

is separating and yields the separating scheme
Σ =

1 1 0 1 α1/2 α1/2 α1/2 1 α2 1
1 0 1 1 α1/2 α1/2 1 α1/2 1 α2
1 0 0 1 0 1 α1/2 α1/2 α α
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
 .
Note that in the case of Fq = F2 we have α = α2 = α1/2 = 1 and this construction gives a
scheme that is M1.
7 Composition and Proof of the Main Result
We discuss here how to obtain larger examples from small ones by using composition of LSSS.
This is a known operation in secret sharing that consists in substituting a player by several
players by distributing its share using another LSSS. By using this tool and the examples in
Section 6, we present proofs for Main Theorem 4.3 and Theorem 4.6.
Let Σ′ = (n, V ′, (pi′i)
n
i=0) and Σ
′′ = (m,V ′′, (pi′′i )
m
i=0) be LSSS over Fq. Consider the vector
space
V = {(x′, x′′) ∈ V ′ × V ′′ : pi′n(x′) = pi′′0(x′′)} ⊂ V ′ × V ′′.
Then V ∗ = ((V ′)∗ × (V ′′)∗)/〈(pi′n,−pi′′0)〉. Let (α, β) ∈ V ∗ denote the class of the vector
(α, β) ∈ (V ′)∗ × (V ′′)∗. Consider the LSSS Σ = (n+m− 1, V, (pii)n+m−1i=0 ), where
• pii = (pi′i, 0) if i = 0, . . . , n− 1,
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• pin+j−1 = (0, pi′′j ) if j = 1, . . . ,m.
The LSSS Σ is called the composition of Σ′ with Σ′′ and is denoted by Σ = Σ′[Σ′′]. In this
composition, the player n of the scheme Σ′ has been substituted by the set of players of the
scheme Σ′′.
The player sets of Σ′ and Σ′′ can be identified, respectively, with {1, . . . , n − 1, p0} and
{n, . . . , n + m − 1}. Here p0 denotes the player of the scheme Σ′ corresponding to the
linear form pi′n. For a set A ⊂ {1, . . . , n + m − 1}, take A′ = A ∩ {1, . . . , n − 1} and
A′′ = A ∩ {n, . . . , n + m − 1}. Then A is accepting for Σ = Σ′[Σ′′] if and only if A′ is
accepting for Σ′, or A′ ∪ {p0} is accepting for Σ′ and A′′ is accepting for Σ′′. In particular,
Σ has t-privacy if Σ′ has t-privacy. Take β0 = (pi′n, 0) = (0, pi′′0) ∈ V ∗.
Lemma 7.1. The following properties hold.
1. 〈{pii}n−1i=0 〉 ∩ 〈{pii}n+m−1i=n 〉 ⊂ 〈{β0}〉.
2. 〈{pii ⊗ pii}n−1i=0 〉 ∩ 〈{pii ⊗ pii}n+m−1i=n 〉 ⊂ 〈{β0 ⊗ β0}〉.
Proof. The first property is obvious, while the second one is a straightforward conse-
quence of the first one. 4
Consider the LSSS Σ′ \ {p0} = (n− 1, V, (pi′i)n−1i=0 ), that is, the LSSS that is obtained by
removing player p0 from Σ
′.
Proposition 7.2. Suppose that Σ′ \{p0} is not a multiplicative linear secret sharing scheme
(M1). Then the composition Σ = Σ′[Σ′′] is a multiplicative linear secret sharing scheme if
and only if Σ′ and Σ′′ are so.
Proof. Sufficiency is clear. To prove necessity, observe that
〈{pii ⊗ pii}n−1i=0 〉 ∩ 〈{pii ⊗ pii}n+m−1i=n 〉 = 〈{β0 ⊗ β0}〉
if the composition Σ = Σ′[Σ′′] is a multiplicative linear secret sharing scheme 4
Proposition 7.3. If both Σ′ and Σ′′ have product reconstruction (M2), then the composition
Σ = Σ′[Σ′′] has product reconstruction too.
Proof. Suppose that Σ is not M2 and Σ′′ is M2. Then there exists T ∈ Bil(V ∗) with
rkT ≤ 2 such that T (pii, pii) = 0 for i = 1, . . . ,m + n − 1 and T (pi0, pi0) = 1. Consider the
bilinear forms T ′ ∈ Bil((V ′)∗) and T ′′ ∈ Bil((V ′′)∗) defined by
T ′(α1, α2) = T
(
(α1, 0), (α2, 0)
)
and T ′′(β1, β2) = T
(
(0, β1), (0, β2)
)
.
Observe that rkT ′, rkT ′′ ≤ 2. Since Σ′′ is M2 and T ′′(pi′′j , pi′′j ) = 0 for every j = 1, . . . ,m, we
have that
0 = T ′′(pi′′0 , pi
′′
0) = T (β0, β0) = T
′(pi′n, pi
′
n).
Therefore, Σ′ is not M2 because T ′(pi′0, pi′0) = T (pi0, pi0) = 1 and T ′(pi′i, pi
′
i) = 0 for every
i = 1, . . . , n. 4
By composing Shamir’s threshold secret sharing scheme [16] with the small examples
in Section 6, linear secret sharing schemes that are M2 but not M1 are obtained for an
arbitrarily large number of players. Indeed, for every t ≥ 1 and for every prime power
q ≥ 2t + 1, Shamir’s (t + 1, 2t + 1)-threshold secret sharing scheme (or a variant of it if
q = 2t + 1), which has t-privacy and (t + 1)-reconstruction, provides a multiplicative (M1)
Fq-linear secret sharing scheme Σ′ on n′ = 2t + 1 players. Moreover, Σ′ \ {p0} is not M1
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for every player p0. If Σ
′′ is one of the examples over Fq on 9 players in Section 6, then by
Propositions 7.2 and 7.3 the composition Σ = Σ′[Σ′′] is an Fq-linear secret sharing scheme
on n = 2t+ 9 players with t-privacy that is M2 but not M1.
The same idea can be used to construct examples for the notion of strong multiplication.
For every t ≥ 1 and for every prime power q ≥ 3t + 1, a t-strongly multiplicative Fq-linear
secret sharing scheme Σ′ on n′ = 3t + 1 players is obtained from Shamir’s (t + 1, 3t + 1)-
threshold scheme. Consider, as before, a scheme Σ′′ conveniently chosen among the examples
in Section 6 and the composition Σ = Σ′[Σ′′]. Then, Σ is an Fq-linear secret sharing scheme
on n = 3t+ 9 players with t-privacy such that the scheme ΣA is M2 for every set A of n− t
players, but ΣA is not M1 for some set A with n− t players.
The previous constructions prove neither Main Theorem 4.3 nor Theorem 4.6, but the
proofs for those results are derived in a very similar way.
The algebraic geometric constructions from [3, 4, 6] provide, for every finite field Fq and
for infinitely many values of n′ ∈ N, multiplicative (M1) linear secret sharing schemes Σ′
over Fq on n′ players that have t-privacy with t = Ω(n′). By removing some players, we
can assume that there is a player p0 such that Σ
′ \ {p0} is not M1. Let Σ′′ be one of the
schemes over Fq on 9 (or 14 if q = 2) players presented in Section 6. Then the composition
Σ = Σ′[Σ′′] is an Fq-linear secret sharing scheme on n = n′ + 8 (or n = n′ + 13 if q = 2)
players that has t-privacy with t = Ω(n). By Propositions 7.2 and 7.3, The scheme Σ is M2
but not M1. This concludes the proof of Main Theorem 4.3.
The constructions from [3, 4, 6] provide as well, for every finite field Fq and for infinitely
many values of n′ ∈ N, t-strongly multiplicative linear secret sharing schemes over Fq with
t = Ω(n′). Therefore, Theorem 4.6 can be proved similarly to Main Theorem 4.3.
8 The Smallest Examples
We presented in Section 6 examples of linear secret sharing schemes of dimension k = 4 on
9 players that are M2 but not M1. The aim of this section is to prove Theorem 4.5, which
implies that n = 9 is the minimum required number of players in order to have a separation
between the two multiplicativity notions.
We begin with some technical lemmas. We notate P = {1, . . . , n} for the set of players
and Q = {0, 1, . . . , n}. An access structure Γ is Q2 if the set of players is not covered by any
two rejecting sets. It is well-known that the access structure of every multiplicative (M1)
linear secret sharing scheme is Q2, and it is easy to prove that the same applies to the M2
property.
Lemma 8.1. If a linear secret sharing scheme is M2, then its access structure is Q2.
Proof. Suppose that A and B with A∪B = P are rejecting sets for Σ = (n, V, (pii)ni=0).
Then there exist x, y ∈ V such that pi0(x) = pi0(y) = 1, while pii(x) = 0 for every i ∈ A and
pij(y) = 0 for every j ∈ B. By applying Theorem 5.2 to x, y, x′ = 0, y′ = 0, this implies that
Σ is not M2. 4
The accepting sets of the (2, 3)-threshold access structure are precisely those with at least
two players.
Lemma 8.2. Every linear secret sharing scheme for the (2, 3)-threshold access structure is
M1.
Proof. Let Σ = (3, V, (pii)
3
i=0) be an Fq-linear secret sharing scheme with (2, 3)-threshold
access structure. Then we can assume that dimV = 2. Moreover, {pii, pij} is linearly inde-
pendent for every two different i, j ∈ Q. Therefore, there exists a basis of V such that, for
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some a, b ∈ F∗q with a 6= b, the linear forms (pii)3i=0 are given by the columns of the matrix(
1 0 1 1
0 1 a b
)
.
It is easy to check that Σ is M1. 4
Given Σ = (n, V, (pii)
n
i=0) and X ⊂ P, the linear secret sharing scheme Σ \X is obtained
from Σ by removing the players in X. This operation is called puncturing. For example,
Σ \ {n} = (n− 1, V, (pii)n−1i=0 )
Lemma 8.3. Suppose that Σ = (n, V, (pii)
n
i=0) is M2. If there exists a partition Q = X0 ∪X1
with 0 ∈ X0 and X1 6= ∅ such that the span of {pii}i∈X0 has trivial intersection with the span
of {pij}j∈X1, then the scheme Σ \X1 is also M2.
Proof. Suppose that Σ \ X1 is not M2. Then there exist x, y, x′, y′ ∈ V such that
Qx,y,x′,y′(pii) = 0 for every i ∈ X0 \ {0} and Qx,y,x′,y′(pi0) 6= 0. It is not difficult to check
that we can select x, y, x′, y′ ∈ V in such a way that Qx,y,x′,y′(pij) = 0 for every j ∈ X1. This
implies that Σ is not M2. 4
Given a tuple of vectors (pii)i∈Q with pii ∈ V ∗, a set B ⊂ Q is said to be a basis (or an
independent set) if (pii)i∈B is a basis of V ∗ (or, respectively, it is linearly independent). The
following is a well-known result from linear algebra and also matroid theory.
Lemma 8.4. Let B,B′ ⊂ Q be two different bases. Then the following properties are satisfied.
1. If i ∈ B′ \B, then (B′ \ {i}) ∪ {j} is a basis for some j ∈ B \B′.
2. If i ∈ B′ \B, then (B \ {j}) ∪ {i} is a basis for some j ∈ B \B′.
We proceed now with the proof of Theorem 4.5. Let Σ = (n, V, (pii)
n
i=0) be a linear secret
sharing scheme over Fq on n ≤ 8 players. Suppose that Σ is M2. We want to prove that Σ
is also M1.
The access structure of Σ is denoted by Γ and min Γ denotes the family of the minimal
accepting sets. Take k = dimV . We can suppose that V ∗ = 〈pii〉ni=1. If there exists an
accepting set formed by a single player, then Σ is M1. From now on, we assume that all
accepting sets have at least two players.
Claim 8.5. k < n.
Proof. Obviously, k ≤ n. If k = n, there exists a basis B ⊂ Q with 0 ∈ B. Then
P = (B \ {0})∪{j} because |B| = n− 1. Therefore, P is the union of two rejecting sets and
Γ is not Q2, a contradiction. 4
We prove in Claim 8.7 that Σ is M1 if k ≤ 4. We need the following lemma.
Lemma 8.6. Assume dimV = 4 and let {pi1, . . . , pi4} be an Fq-basis of V ∗. Let Q1, Q2 ∈
Quad(V ∗) be linearly independent and such that Qj(pii) = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , 4 and j = 1, 2.
Then there exists λ ∈ Fq such that Q1 + λQ2 is not separating.
Proof. Let U1, U2 ∈ F4×4q be the unique upper-triangular matrices associated to Q1 and
Q2, respectively, in the basis {pi1, . . . , pi4} of V ∗. Then
U1 =

0 α1
0 0
A1
0
0 β1
0 0
 , U2 =

0 α2
0 0
A2
0
0 β2
0 0

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for some α1, α2, β1, β2 ∈ Fq, A1, A2 ∈ F2×2q . Reordering the basis, we may assume that
α2 6= 0. Take λ = −α1/α2. Then the matrix U3 = U1 + λU2 has rank at most 2. This
implies, by Lemma 2.2, that the bilinear form whose associated matrix is U3 is of the form
x⊗ y − x′ ⊗ y′ for some x, y, x′, y′ ∈ F4q and therefore Q1 + λQ2 is not separating. 4
Claim 8.7. If k ≤ 4, then Σ is M1.
Proof. By Proposition 5.3, Σ is M1 if k ≤ 3. Suppose that k = 4. Since dim Sym(V ) =
10, we have that dim I(Σ) ≥ 2. By iterated application of Lemma 8.6, we can replace all
separating forms in a basis of I(Σ) with non-separating forms, obtaining a basis (Qj)
r
j=1
of I(Σ) consisting entirely of non-separating forms. Since Σ is M2, Qj(pi0) = 0 for all
j = 1 . . . , r, and hence pi0 ∈W (Σ). Therefore, Σ is M1. 4
From now on, we suppose that 5 ≤ k ≤ n− 1, and hence 6 ≤ n ≤ 8. Take a set B ⊂ Q
such that 0 ∈ B and B is a basis (such a set always exists). Then X = B \ {0} /∈ Γ, and
hence Y = P \X ∈ Γ because Γ is Q2. In addition, |Y | = n− k + 1.
Claim 8.8. If Y is a minimal accepting set, then Σ is M1.
Proof. If Y is a minimal accepting subset, then Y is independent. Since pi0 is in the
span of {pij}j∈Y , there exists X1 ⊂ X such that B′ = X1 ∪ Y is a basis. By Lemma 8.4, for
every i ∈ X \X1 ⊂ B \ B′, there exists j ∈ B′ \ B = Y such that B′′i = (B \ {i}) ∪ {j} is a
basis. This implies that B′′i \ {0} = (X \ {i}) ∪ {j} is not in Γ, and hence its complement
(Y \ {j}) ∪ {i} is accepting. Then pii is in the span of {pi` : ` ∈ (Y \ {j}) ∪ {0}} because
Y \{j} /∈ Γ, and hence pii is in the span of {pi`}`∈Y . Therefore, every vector pii with i ∈ Q\X1
is in the span of {pi`}`∈Y . Take X0 = Q\X1. Since X1∪Y is a basis, the span of {pii}i∈X0 has
trivial intersection with the span of {pij}j∈X1 . Therefore, Σ′ = Σ\{X1} is M2 by Lemma 8.3.
The dimension of Σ′ is k− |X1| = n− k+ 1 ≤ 4. Then Σ′ is M1 by Claim 8.7, and hence so
is Σ. 4
Claim 8.9. If k = n− 1, then Σ is M1.
Proof. Since |Y | = n − k + 1 = 2, we have that Y is a minimal accepting set. Apply
Claim 8.8. 4
As a consequence, Σ is M1 if n = 6. From now on, we assume that 7 ≤ n ≤ 8 and
5 ≤ k ≤ n− 2.
Claim 8.10. If every pair {i, j} ⊂ Q with i 6= j is independent and k = n− 2, then Σ is M1.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we can suppose that B = {0, 4, . . . , n} and Y =
{1, 2, 3}. If Y is a minimal accepting set, then Σ is M1 by Claim 8.8. Otherwise, we can
assume that {1, 2} ∈ min Γ. If pi3 is in the span of {pi1, pi2}, then Σ′ = Σ \ (P \ Y ) is a
(2, 3)-threshold scheme and Σ′ is M1 by Lemma 8.2. This implies that Σ is M1. Otherwise,
we can assume that {1, 2, 3, . . . , n−2} is a basis. Since pi0 is a linear combination of {pi1, pi2},
then {0, 2, 3, . . . , n− 2} is a basis, and hence {1, n− 1, n} ∈ Γ. If this is a minimal accepting
set, then Σ is M1 by Claim 8.8. Since B = {0, 4, . . . , n} is a basis, {n− 1, n} /∈ Γ. Without
loss of generality, we can assume that {1, n} ∈ Γ. Then Σ\ (P\{1, 2, n}) is a (2, 3)-threshold
scheme, and hence Σ is M1. 4
Claim 8.11. If k = n− 2, then Σ is M1.
Proof. Suppose n = 7 and k = 5. If the pair {pii, pij} is linearly dependent, then by
removing (puncturing) one of these players an M2 LSSS on 6 players is obtained, which is
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also M1. Otherwise, Σ is M1 by Claim 8.10. The proof is analogous for the case n = 8 and
k = 6. 4
At this point, only the case n = 8, k = 5 remains unproven. Since every M2 linear secret
sharing scheme on 7 players is M1, we can suppose that every pair {i, j} ⊂ Q with i 6= j is
independent.
Claim 8.12. Consider Z ⊂ Q with 3 ≤ |Z| ≤ 4 and 0 ∈ Z. Let W be the span of {pij}j∈Z
and take C = {i ∈ Q : pii ∈W}. If |C| ≥ |Z|+ 3, then Σ is M1.
Proof. Take Z ′ ⊂ Z such that {pij}j∈Z′ is a basis of W . Take A = Q \ C ⊂ P . By a
simple case analysis, it is not difficult to check that there exist disjoint sets A1, A2 ⊂ A such
that A1 ∪A2 = A and {pij}j∈Z′∪Ai is linearly independent for i = 1, 2.
Suppose that Σ is not M1. Then Σ′ = Σ \ A is not M1 and, since its dimension is
|Z ′| ≤ 4, it is not M2. Then there exists a quadratic form Q = Qx,y,x′,y′ ∈ Quad(V ∗) such
that Q(pi0) 6= 0 while Q(pii) = 0 for every i ∈ C \ {p0}. Moreover, by basic linear algebra
there exist vectors u, v, u′, v′ ∈ V such that
• pi(u) = pi(x), pi(v) = pi(y), pi(u′) = pi(x′), and pi(v′) = pi(y′) for all pi ∈W , and
• pii(u) = pii(u′) = 0 for every i ∈ A1, and
• pij(v) = pij(v′) = 0. for every j ∈ A2.
Consider the quadratic form Q′ = Qu,v,u′,v′ . Observe that Q′(pii) = Q(pii) if i ∈ C and
Q′(pij) = 0 if j /∈ C. This implies that Σ is not M2, a contradiction. 4
Without loss of generality B = {0, 5, 6, 7, 8} is a basis. Let Y = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Remember
that Y is an accepting set. If Y is a minimal accepting set, then Σ is M1 by Claim 8.8.
Otherwise, we distinguish two cases
Case 1 {1, 2, 3} is a minimal accepting set. We consider two subcases, depending on
whether pi4 is in the span of {pi1, pi2, pi3} or not. If yes, we can assume that {1, 2, 3, 5, 6} is
a basis. Then every set of the form {0, x, y, 5, 6} with x, y ∈ {1, 2, 3} and x 6= y is a basis,
and hence every set of the form {i, 4, 7, 8} with i ∈ {1, 2, 3} is accepting. If one of them
is a minimal accepting set, then Σ is M1 by Claim 8.8. Observe that {7, 8} /∈ Γ because
{7, 8} ⊂ B. If {i, 4, j} ∈ Γ for some i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and j ∈ {7, 8} such that {i, 4} /∈ Γ, then pij is
in the span of {pi0, pii, pi4} and Σ is M1 by Claim 8.12 with Z = {0, 1, 2} (since pi3,pi4,pij are in
the span of {pi0, pi1, pi2}). If a set of the form {i, 7, 8} with i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} is accepting, then pi8
is in the span of {pi0, pii, pi7}, and hence the dimension of the span of {pi0, pi1, pi2, pi3, pi4, pi7, pi8}
is at most 4. Again, Σ is M1 by Claim 8.12. Suppose now that pi4 is not in the span of
{pi1, pi2, pi3}. Then we can assume that {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} is a basis. By using a similar argument
as before, every set of the form {i, 6, 7, 8} with i = 1, 2, 3 is accepting. Since {6, 7, 8} is
not accepting, the vector pii is in the span of {pi0, pi6, pi7, pi8} for every i = 1, 2, 3. Apply
Claim 8.12 with Z = {0, 6, 7, 8}.
Case 2 All minimal accepting subsets of Y have exactly 2 players. We can assume that
{1, 2} ∈ Γ. By Lemma 8.2, we can assume that {pi1, pi2, pi3} is linearly independent. Suppose
that pi4 is in the span of {pi1, pi2, pi3} and that {1, 2, 3, 5, 6} is a basis. Then B′ = {p0, 2, 3, 5, 6}
is a basis and Y ′ = {1, 4, 7, 8} ∈ Γ. If Y ′ is a minimal accepting set or {1, 4} ∈ Γ, then Σ
is M1. If there is a minimal accepting subset of Y ′ with cardinality 3, then we can reduce
to Case 1. Since {7, 8} ⊂ B, this set is not accepting. The only remaining case is that
there exists an accepting set {i, j} with i ∈ {1, 4} and j ∈ {7, 8}. Then pij is in the span of
{pi1, pi2, pi3} and Σ is M1 by Claim 8.12. Suppose now that pi4 is not in the span of {pi1, pi2, pi3}.
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Then we can assume that {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} is a basis. Then B′ = {p0, 2, 3, 4, 5} is a basis and
Y ′ = {1, 6, 7, 8} ∈ Γ. The proof is concluded by using a similar argument as before.
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